Louisiana Law Review
Volume 28 | Number 3
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1966-1967 Term: A Symposium
April 1968

Criminal Procedure - Due Process in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings
James M. Small

Repository Citation
James M. Small, Criminal Procedure - Due Process in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 28 La. L. Rev. (1968)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol28/iss3/26

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

great concern with the specificity requirement. A third possibility is to develop a new category of limitations exclusively for
search in hot pursuit.
The judicial history of the fourth amendment reveals a
balancing of the need for effective law enforcement against the
right of the people to be free from unreasonable intrusions by
the state. To completely deny the right of search in hot pursuit
situations would appear to unduly hamper efforts to apprehend
escaping felons. This the Court did not do. But while the principle is a desirable one, considerable uncertainties remain to be
clarified, some of which have perhaps been indicated in this Note.
Dan E. Melichar

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DuE PROCESS IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS

Gerald Gault, a fifteen year old on juvenile court probation,
was arrested pursuant to a neighbor's verbal allegation that she
had received an obscene phone call from him. His parents were
not informed of his arrest, nor were they notified of an informal
hearing held the next day. After spending four days in a detention home, Gault was released. Mrs. Gault then received a note
informing her that further hearings concerning her son's "delinquency" were pending. At the second hearing Gault was
adjudged a delinquent and committed to the State Industrial
School for the duration of his minority. The offended neighbor
was not present at either hearing nor were records made of the
to lawful arrest). The Court said: "The requirement that warrants shall
particularly describe the things to be seized . . . prevents the seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Id. at 196.
In Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965), the Court, citing Marron with
approval, held that officers who seized a large quantity of the petitioner's
private books and papers under a warrant authorizing the search for written
instruments concerning the Communist Party had violated the fourth amendment, because the warrant did not describe, with sufficient particularity, that
which was to be seized. A similar holding is found in Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961), involving the seizure of obscene publications. But see lower federal court cases upholding the seizure of evidence
not described in the warrant: Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 825 (10th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1967); Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d
602 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1965); United States v. Myers,
329 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962); Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d
539 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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hearings. There was considerable confusion as to what the boy
had admitted while in custody and at no stage of the proceedings was he represented by counsel. Neither he nor his parents
were informed of his constitutional rights. Because no appeal
from a juvenile court ruling is allowed under Arizona law,
Gault's parents sought habeas corpus relief which was denied
by the Arizona Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court reversed. Held, in any delinquency proceedings which
may lead to incarceration, due process demands that the accused
be afforded adequate notice of the charges, right to retained or
appointed counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. In re Gault
387 U.S. 1(1967).
Due process in juvenile court proceedings has been a muchdebated issue. Most courts have relied on the parens patriael
rationale in dismissing alleged violations of constitutional rights.
Under this reasoning juvenile cases have been viewed as civil
proceedings aimed at rehabilitation and protection, not criminal
proceedings aimed at punishment,2 and constitutional safeguards
applicable to adult criminal proceedings have been denied.
The Court in the instant case, however, made a realistic
appraisal of juvenile court proceedings. Looking beyond benevolent motives underlying juvenile court statutes, the Court
concluded that the traditional distinction between criminal cases
and juvenile proceedings had little basis in fact. Despite the
"goodwill and compassion" supposedly found in juvenile court
systems, juveniles are often subject to longer confinement than
1. For an excellent discussion of the parens patriae theory, see Cinque
v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923). See also the appendix to Judge
Prettyman's opinion in Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
2. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 603, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954), succinctly
stated the position: "Appellants able counsel has urged upon us, as upon
the Superior Court many claims of Illegality and deprivation of constitutional
rights in connection with the proceeding before the Municipal Court. Such
claims, however, entirely overlook, in our opinion, the basic concept of a
juvenile court. The proceedings in such a court are not in the nature of a
criminal trial but constitute merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the
treatment, reformation, and rehabilitation of the minor child. Their purpose
Is not penal but protective, aimed to check juvenile delinquency and to throw
around the child, just starting, perhaps, on an evil course and deprived of
proper parental care, the strong arm of the state acting as parens patriae.
The state is not seeking to punish an offender but to salvage a boy who
may be in danger of becoming one, and to safeguard his adolescent life."
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adults committing the same offense.8 That confinement is in an
"Industrial School" rather than prison does not mitigate the
effect. 4 Similarly, the terms "delinquent" and "criminal" embody

no significant factual distinction. 5 If juvenile proceedings and
criminal trials are substantially similar in ultimate effect "the
youngster has been cheated of his constitutional rights by false
labeling." 6 The issue in the instant case was not whether due
process requirements apply to juvenile court proceedings, 7 but
what specific rights flow from its application. Although the precise methods by which juvenile courts will implement the
Court's guidelines remain uncertain, the decision clearly necessitates major revision of the general approach to the treatment
of delinquency. 8
That juvenile courts are powerless to act unless notice of
charge has been given has long been recognized. 9 The instant
case considers the adequacy of notice. Gault's parents received
3. In the instant case, had Gault been over eighteen, the maximum punishment would have been a fine of five to fifty dollars or imprisonment not
to exceed two months. Amz. REv. STAT. §§ 8-201-02 (1956). As a juvenile he
was subjected to confinement for the duration of his minority-five years.
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967): "The fact of the matter is that,
however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home,' or an 'industrial school'
for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes 'a building with
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional laws.' Instead of
mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his
world is peopled with guards, custodians, state employees, and 'delinquents'
confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide."
5. In Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447
(1946), the court said: "The judgment against a youth that he is delinquent
is a serious reflection upon his character and habits. The stain against him
is not removed merely because the statute says no judgment in this particular proceeding shall be deemed a conviction for crime or so considered.
This stigma of conviction will reflect upon him for life. It hurts his selfrespect. It may, at some inopportune, unfortunate moment, rear its ugly
head to destroy his opportunity for advancement, and blast his ambition to
build up a character and reputation entitling him to the esteem and respect
of his fellow man."
6. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MiNN. L. REV. 547, 550
(1957).
7. Courts under both federal and state constitutions have held that due
process is applicable to proceedings in juvenile court to determine guilt.
Matters of W. and S., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 224 N.E.2d 102 (1966);
In Interest of Carlo and Stasilowicz, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966). See
authorities cited 387 U.S. 1, n.8 (1967).
8. In Louisiana the greatest impact of the instant case will be felt in
the rural parishes where procedures in juvenile courts have been more
informal than in urban parishes. See generally The Gault Case: Its Effect
on Juvenile Court Practicesin the Rural Parishes (an unpublished student
project on file in the LSU Law Library).
9. In re People v. Harris, 343 Ill. App. 462, 99 N.E.2d 390 (1951); In re
Roth, 158 Neb. 789, 64 N.W.2d 799 (1954); Reyna v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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only a note written on plain paper advising them of the date
of the second hearing. The Court found the notice inadequate
notwithstanding the appearance of Gault's parents at the two
hearings "without objection."' 0 Thus neither the parent's actual
knowledge of the charge nor failure to object to lack of adequate
notice constituted waiver of the right."' Gault requires that
notice be given sufficiently in advance of the hearing to afford
ample time for preparation, and that it be of the type constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. 12 These
requirements clearly prohibit the use of vague petitions and
general allegations of delinquency.'3
1 4
Few states have required notice of the right to counsel.
Kent v. United States, 5 held that assistance of counsel was
essential to the validity of a transfer of jurisdiction by a juvenile court to a district court. The instant case clearly requires
assistance of counsel in all juvenile proceedings where the child
is subject to confinement. Mrs. Gault's knowledge that she could
have appeared with a lawyer did not constitute a waiver of the
right to be so advised. The person must be expressly advised
of the right to retain counsel and, if financially unable to do so,
to have counsel appointed by the court. 16 Failure to so advise

10. Upon learning from a neighbor that Gault was In custody, Mrs. Gault
proceeded to the detention home. She was Informed by the superintendent
of the detention home that a hearing would be held in juvenile court the
following day.
1 11. The contrary has been true in Louisiana; the child has not been
deemed to have been denied due process where his parents appeared voluntarily. In re Tilotson, 225 La. 573, 73 So.2d 466 (1954); State v. Neal, 169 La.
441, 125 So. 442 (1929); In re State in the Interest of Cook, 145 So.2d 627 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962).
12. As to constitutional adequacy of notice in criminal proceedings, see
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-78 (1948).
As to adequacy in a civil context, see, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). These cases clearly preclude the possibility of a general allegation
of delinquency being deemed adequate.
13. In the Matter of Kenneth Lee Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
held that a petition charging a juvenile with striking a victim, and demanding that the victim turn over his money, was too indefinite to appraise the
juvenile of the charge against him. The court noted that the petition could
be interpreted as a charge of robbery, attempted robbery, assault, or all
three. In the instant case Gault was charged with "delinquency."
14. In People ex rel. Weber v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303
(1955), the court based its denial of the right to appointed counsel on the
parens patriae theory. Some courts, however, have held that important
rights, such as the right to counsel, cannot be brushed aside merely by a
"change of label." See, e.g., Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Shioutaken v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
15. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
16. 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967).
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would render any subsequent incarceration illegal and release
of the child would be in order. 17
Certain language used by the Court could create confusion
with respect to waiver of right to counsel. The right to be represented by counsel is clearly the child's right,' but the Court
intimates that the right may be waived by the parents.19 Though
the possibility of parental waiver is not necessarily inconsistent
with the view that the right of representation belongs to the
child,20 clarification of this point by the Court seems desirable.
Arguably, attorneys are not properly trained to function in
the juvenile court setting. The mere presence of a lawyer,
however, might have a desirable effect on the conduct of the
conproceedings. It seems certain, moreover, that the bar can
21
process.
due
of
notions
developing
tinue to adapt to the
Under Gault the juvenile must also be afforded the rights
of confrontation, cross-examination, and the privilege against
self-incrimination. 22 The basis of the initial adjudication of
delinquency in the instant case was the admissions made by
Gault at the two hearings. The Court noted that a skeptical view
17. In Applications of Johnnie J. Billie and Leroy Jewelryman, 429 P.2d
699 (Ariz. 1967), it was held that where parents and petitioners were not

advised of their right to counsel, detention in an industrial school was illegal. The petitioners were ordered released.

18. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967): "[Tlhe child and his parents must be advised
of the child's right to be represented by counsel."
19. Id.: "Mrs. Gault's knowledge that she could employ counsel is not an
'intentional relinquishment or abandonment' of a fully known right." This
clearly seems to indicate that had Mrs. Gault been advised of the right to
counsel, an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment" of the right by her
would suffice as a waiver.
20. The child's ability to waive his constitutional rights will depend in
part on his ability to understand them. In re Butterfield, 61 Cal. Rptr. 874
(1967); People v. Gomez, 60 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1967). In the Butterfield case
a fifteen-year-old girl entered into wardship proceedings not knowing that
long term confinement in a correctional institution was possible. The court
held that the child's waiver of counsel was not an intelligent waiver and
absence of counsel deprived her of due process.
It seems that in cases where waiver by the child would be impossible,
because of the child's inability to understand his constitutional rights,
necessity will demand that the decision with respect to waiver be made by
the parents. In cases where the parents' interests are adverse to those of
the child, counsel for the juvenile should be required. State v. Maloney, 433
P.2d 625 (Ariz. 1967); Marsden v. Commonwealth, 227 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1967).
21. It seems certain that the requirement of appointed counsel will add
to the practical problems of implementation occasioned by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). As
to these problems, see generally Comment, Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases: Guidelines for Louisiana,27 LA. L. Rsv. 592 (1967).
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967).
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must be taken of child confessions in certain situations. 23 The
need for careful examination of confessions made by juveniles
seems even greater in states like Arizona where a juvenile court
may waive jurisdiction in favor of a district court and thus sub-.>,
ject the juvenile to criminal prosecution. 24 The absence of possible criminal prosecution, however, will not preclude the application of the fifth amendment privilege. 25 The Court specifically
stated that delinquency proceedings are to be regarded as criminal for purposes of the privilege. 26 In the absence of a valid confession supporting an adjudication of delinquency, future adjudications will be subject to reversal unless the elements "confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses available for crossexamination" are presentYT
The requirements of the instant case logically follow the
Court's conclusion that the difference between criminal trials
and juvenile delinquency proceedings does not justify denial of
constitutional safeguards to the juvenile. Mr. Justice Harlan
felt that due process could have been satisfied by requirements
of timely notice of charges, right to counsel, and a written
record of the proceedings. 28 This view differs from that expressed
23. Id. at 45. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948), Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said: "What transpired would make us pause
for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a
mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used." Haley dealt with the "criminal" prosecution
of a juvenile. However, in recent appellate court cases adjudications of
delinquency based on confessions obtained under circumstances similar to
those in Haley have been set aside because of the inadmissibility of the confession. See the Matter of W and S, 19 N.Y.2d 55, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 224
N.E.2d 102 (1966); The Interests of Carlo and Stasilowicz, 48 N.J. 224, 255
A.2d 110 (1966).
24. ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 15, as amended, 1960; ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 8-223,
8-228(A) (1956).
25. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause, states:
"No person shall ...
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." It is well settled, however, that the privilege may be
invoked in any proceeding, regardless of its nature, so long as the statement
is or may be inculpatory. In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S.
52, 94 (1964), Mr. Justice White, concurring, said: "The privilege can be
claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial,
investigatory or adjudicatory ...
and it protects any disclosures which the
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution
or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." See also Mal-

loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
26. 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
27. Id. at 57. In many Louisiana parishes, this requirement will effect a
far more formal procedure than has heretofore existed. See generally The
Gault Case: Its Effect on Juvenile Court Practices in the Rural Parishes,
an unpublished student project on file in the LSU Law Library.
28. Id.
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by the majority only as to degree. Gault's importance lies in the
Court's recognition that due process requires more safeguards
in juvenile courts than have previously been provided. It is
likely that notions of fundamental fairness will give rise to the
29
application of additional constitutional safeguards in the future.
James M. Small

ERRONEOUS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PAYMENTS:
EFFECTIVE DODGE OF TORT LIABILITY?

After four years of receiving workmen's compensation payments for an injury sustained while employed by defendant
as a clerk, plaintiff was notified that payments were being
discontinued. Defendant contended payments had been made
only by error, that plaintiff was not engaged in a hazardous
occupation, and that her employer (defendant) was not engaged
in a hazardous business. Plaintiff sued for workman's compensation or, in the alternative, damages for injury ex delicto.
The trial court upheld both defendant's exception of no cause
of action as to workmen's compensation and the exception of
prescription to her action ex delicto. On appeal plaintiff's counsel conceded that the workmen's compensation statute afforded
no coverage to plaintiff. Held, the ex delicto claim was prescribed; prescription was not suspended or interrupted by the
erroneous payment of workmen's compensation. Williamson v.
S. S. Kresge Co., 186 So.2d 696 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writs
denied, 187 So.2d 741.
Does this case suggest a ready scheme for an employer
29. Several state courts, relying on the instant decision, have required
recordation of the proceedings, a point which was mentioned but not ruled
upon in Gault. Ebersole v. State, 428 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1967); Summers v.
State, 227 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. 1967). It has also been held, as a result of Gault,
that juveniles have the same rights as adults to suppress illegally obtained
evidence (State v. Lowery, 95 N.J. Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967), and that
change of venue procedure must be accorded juveniles (State v. Lake Juvenile Court, 228 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. 1967)). It seems certain, moreover, that the
rationale of Gault will not be limited to proceedings in juvenile courts.
Already a state court has cited Gault as authority for its decision applying
right to counsel to proceedings before a lunacy commission. Commonwealth
v. Shovlin, 210 Pa. Super. 295, 231 A.2d 760 (1967). The court said: "The argument that McGurrin has not been formally convicted of a crime is no more
persuasive than the argument in Gault that the juvenile is only adjudged
'delinquent.' Euphemistic terminology cannot obscure the fact that McGurrin has been thrown in the company of murderers, rapists, and criminals
of every other conceivable nature." Id. at 298, 231 A.2d at 762. See also
Parker v. Heryford, 379 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1967).

